Informal property rights as stable conventions in hawk-dove games with many players
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wood, Daniel H. |
Published in: |
Journal of evolutionary economics : JEE. - Berlin, Germany : Springer, ISSN 0936-9937, ZDB-ID 1055126-8. - Vol. 25.2015, 4, p. 849-873
|
Subject: | N-player games | Hawk-dove | Stochastic stability | Convention | Informal property rights | Payoff-irrelevant asymmetry | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Sachenrecht | Law of property | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | Theory of property rights | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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