Information Advantage in Stackelberg Duopoly under Demand Uncertainty

We consider a Stackelberg model under demand slope uncertainty in an environment where the follower owns information advantage. Specifically, we show that the second mover obtains higher expected profit than the first mover when the leader only knows the prior beliefs and the follower gains the posterior probabilities. This result tells us that the leadership advantage is dominated by the information advantage when demand fluctuation is important.

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Year of publication:	2007-12-01
Authors:	Xu, Jin
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Stackelberg \| uncertainty \| information advantage

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616688