Information aggregation with runoff voting
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tsakas, Nikolas ; Xefteris, Dimitrios |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 191.2021, p. 1-40
|
Subject: | Information aggregation | Condorcet jury theorem | Partisan voters | Runoff voting | Sequential elimination | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Aggregation | Wahlsystem | Electoral system |
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