Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
Helmuts Āzacis
| Year of publication: |
2020
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Āzacis, Helmuts |
| Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 49.2020, 2, p. 411-444
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| Subject: | Efficiency | Information disclosure | Seller's revenue | Sequential first-price auctions | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00182-020-00710-8 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591589