Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis
We study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We focus on the one-sided case and perform a dynamic analysis of a constant entry flow model. The same question has been studied in an identical framework in Serrano and Yosha (1993) but they limit their analysis to the stationary steady states. Blouin and Serrano (2001) study information revelation in a one-time entry model and obtain different results from the ones of Serrano and Yosha (1993). We establish that the main difference is not due to the steady state analysis but to the differences concerning the entry assumption.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Tanguy, Isaac |
Published in: |
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704. - Vol. 10.2010, 1, p. 1-17
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Publisher: |
De Gruyter |
Saved in:
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