Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents

Alia Gizatulina; Martin Hellwig

For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs, i.e., even if the so-called BDP property ("Beliefs Determine Preferences") of Neeman (2004) does not hold. The contrary result of Neeman (2004) rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them. -- surplus extraction ; mechanism design ; BDP ; informational smallness ; correlated information

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Gizatulina, Alia ; Hellwig, Martin
Publisher:	Bonn : Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Informationsverhalten \| Information behaviour \| Rent-Seeking \| Rent seeking \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Erwartungsbildung \| Expectation formation \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Theorie \| Theory