Insider Trading, Equity Issues and CEO Turnover in Firms Subject to Securities Class Actions
This study finds that the managers of firms that have been the target of class action lawsuits alleging securities fraud did not, on average, have an unusual incentive to conceal negative information. Nevertheless, CEO turnover is higher in those cases where the suites have merit, indicating that securities class action lawsuits do have a disciplining effect.
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | Niehaus, Greg ; Roth, Greg |
Published in: |
Financial Management. - Financial Management Association - FMA. - Vol. 28.1999, 4
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Publisher: |
Financial Management Association - FMA |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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