Institutional Modifications of Majority Rule

Social and economic development requires some degree of stable policy making. The instability of group decision making under majority rule ahs preoccupied social theorists since Condorcet. In theory, subtle institutional modifications to pure majority rule should induce stability. This paper reviews experimental evidence regarding these stability inducing modifications. The experiments examine the impact of agenda control, super-majorities, veto powers, and bicameralism on group decision making

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Bottom, William P. ; Eavey, Cheryl L. ; King, Ronald R. ; Handlin, Larry B. ; Miller, Gary J.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Theorie \| Theory \| Institutionenökonomik \| Institutional economics \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]