Insurance and inequality with persistent private information
Alex Bloedel, Vijay Krishna and Oksana Leukhina
| Year of publication: |
7th September 2018
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Bloedel, Alex ; Krishna, R. Vijay ; Leukhina, Oksana |
| Publisher: |
St. Louis, MO : Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Research Division |
| Subject: | Immiseration | inequality | high-powered incentives | dynamic contracting | recursive contracts | principal-agent problem | persistent private information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertrag | Contract | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 101 Seiten) Illustrationen |
|---|---|
| Series: | Working paper. - Saint Louis, Mo., ZDB-ID 2135914-3. - Vol. 2018, 020A (September 2018) |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.20955/wp.2018.020 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011914184