Insurance contracts with adverse selection when the insurer has ambiguity about the composition of the consumers
Year of publication: |
May 2016
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Authors: | Zheng, Mingli ; Wang, Chong ; Li, Chaozheng |
Published in: |
Annals of economics and finance. - Beijing : Peking University Press, ISSN 1529-7373, ZDB-ID 2097904-6. - Vol. 17.2016, 1, p. 181-208
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Subject: | Adverse selection | Monopoly | Insurance | Ambiguity | Epsilon-contaminated prior | Adverse Selektion | Theorie | Theory | Versicherung | Monopol | Risiko | Risk | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance | Versicherungsmarkt | Insurance market | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Konsumentenverhalten | Consumer behaviour |
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