Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection

This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Jeleva, Meglena ; Villeneuve, Bertrand
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 23.2004, 4, p. 777-794
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Imprecise probabilities \| Insurance markets \| Adverse selection

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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