Insurance contracts with imprecise probabilities and adverse selection

This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in the framework of imprecise probabilities and adverse selection. Agents differ not only in the objective risk they face but also in the perception of risk. In monopoly, a range of configurations that VNM preferences preclude appears: a pooling contract may be optimal, incomplete coverage may be offered to high risks, low risks may be better covered.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Jeleva, Meglena ; Villeneuve, Bertrand
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Imprecise probabilities \| Insurance markets \| Adverse selection

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Economic theory, 2004, Vol. 23, no. 4. pp. 777-794.Length: 17 pages
Classification:	G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706368