Intellectual Property Rights in a Quality-Ladder Model with Persistent Leadership

This article analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting non-expiring forward protection reduces the rate of innovation and imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces R&D spending. It is shown that full protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes the average innovation rate

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Kiedaisch, Christian
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Immaterialgüterrechte \| Intellectual property rights \| Theorie \| Theory \| Patentrecht \| Patent law \| Innovation \| Imitationsstrategie \| Imitation strategy \| Technologietransfer \| Technology transfer \| Marktführer \| Market leader

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