Interacting mechanisms : a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
Françoise Forges, Frédéric Koessler, Andrés Salamanca
| Year of publication: |
2024
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Forges, Françoise ; Koessler, Frédéric ; Salamanca, Andrés |
| Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam : North-Holland, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 1491091-3. - Vol. 114.2024, Art.-No. 103023, p. 1-13
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| Subject: | Communication equilibrium | Corporations | Correlated equilibrium | Mechanism design | Multiple principals | Perfect Bayesian equilibrium | Revelation principle | Robust equilibrium | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103023 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015072119