Interfirm Relationships And Informal Credit In Vietnam
Trading relations in Vietnam's emerging private sector are shaped by two market frictions: the difficulty of locating trading partners and the absence of legal enforcement of contracts. Examining relational contracting, we find that a firm trusts its customer enough to offer credit when the customer finds it hard to locate an alternative supplier.A longer duration of trading relationship is associated with larger credit, as is prior information gathering. Customers identified through business networks receive more credit. These network effects are enduring, suggesting that networks are used to sanction defaulting customers. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year of publication: |
1999
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Authors: | McMillan, John ; Woodruff, Christopher |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 114.1999, 4, p. 1285-1320
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
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