Internationally coordinated emission permit policies : an option for withdrawers from the Kyoto protocol?
This paper investigates the welfare costs of unilateral versus internationally coordinated emission permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer carbon emissions. We show that, for a net foreign debtor country, the domestic welfare costs of a unilateral domestic permit policy are larger than of an internationally coordinated policy if the world economy is dynamically efficient. From the perspective of a net foreign debtor country that has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, an internationally coordinated permit policy is dominated by climate political inaction also in the post-Kyoto era since bearing the costs of foreign actionism is cheaper, in terms of welfare, than agreeing on international policy coordination - unless the world economy becomes dynamically inefficient.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Bednar-Friedl, Birgit ; Farmer, Karl |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | Emissionsrechte | Klimaschutz | Umweltabkommen | Außenwirtschaft | Wirtschaftliche Effizienz | Wohlfahrtseffekt | Zwei-Länder-Modell | Overlapping Generations | Theorie | emission permit policies | trade | overlapping generations | welfare |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 2764 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 609967347 [GVK] hdl:10419/30591 [Handle] |
Classification: | Q52 - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects ; Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters ; D91 - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266024