Investment Constraints and Delegated Portfolio Management

This paper examines the optimal use of investment constraints in delegated portfolio management. We show that investment constraints, which limit managers' uses of margin purchase and short-sales, can benefit investors by enhancing managers' incentives to acquire long-term investment information – information that identifies significant asset mispricing, which may take a long time to be corrected. Our analysis helps explain why mutual fund managers are typically subject to much tighter investment constraints and receive less high-powered compensation than do hedge fund managers

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Liu, Wei-Lin
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Portfolio-Management \| Portfolio selection \| Theorie \| Theory \| Institutioneller Investor \| Institutional investor \| Investmentfonds \| Investment Fund

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035859