Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts
Year of publication: |
1999 ; Als Ms. gedr.
|
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Publisher: |
Aachen : Shaker |
Subject: | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Betriebliche Investitionstheorie | Corporate investment theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Bildungsinvestition | Human capital investment | Haftung | Liability | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Investitionsverhalten | Kontrakttheorie |
Description of contents: | Table of Contents [gbv.de] |
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Why banks? : Microeconomic foundations of financial intermediaries
Rühle, Ilonka, (1998)
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Why banks? : Microeconomic foundations of financial intermediaries
Rühle, Ilonka, (1997)
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Bounded rationality and contracts
Tröger, Thomas, (1999)
- More ...
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Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?
Oechssler, Jörg, (2008)
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When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods?
Schmitz, Patrick W., (2024)
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On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem
Schmitz, Patrick W., (2002)
- More ...