Irresolute mechanism design : a new path to possibility
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Korpela, Ville |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 52.2023, 4, p. 993-1007
|
Subject: | Collective decision making | Condorcet rule | Implementation | Impossibility results | Nash equilibrium | Social choice theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting |
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