Irreversibility and monitoring in dynamic games : experimental evidence
Year of publication: |
[2020]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Choi, Andrew ; Choi, Syngjoo ; Guéron, Yves ; Lee, Eungik |
Publisher: |
[Seoul] : [Institute of Economic Research] |
Subject: | repeated games | dynamic games | imperfect monitoring | irreversibility | cooperation | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Experiment | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods |
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