Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a Right-of-First-Refusal in a procurement auction? : experimental evidence
Year of publication: |
April 2015
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Authors: | Brisset, Karine ; Cochard, François ; Maréchal, François |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 78.2015, 4, p. 639-665
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Subject: | Experimental procurement auction | Right-of-First-Refusal | First-price reverse auction | Risk-aversion | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Experiment | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Auktion | Auction | Beschaffung | Procurement | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
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