Is there a "dark side" to monitoring? : board and shareholder monitoring effects on M&A performance extremeness
Year of publication: |
November 2017
|
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Authors: | Goranova, Maria L. ; Priem, Richard L. ; Ndofor, Hermann Achidi ; Chapman, Cheryl A. Trahms |
Published in: |
Strategic management journal. - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 0143-2095, ZDB-ID 164405-1. - Vol. 38.2017, 11, p. 2285-2297
|
Subject: | corporate governance | M&A performance extremeness | monitoring | board of directors | institutional shareholders | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Board of Directors | Board of directors | Vorstand | Executive board | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Unternehmenserfolg | Firm performance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Institutioneller Investor | Institutional investor |
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