Is there a "retail challenge" to banks' resolvability? What do we know about the holders of bail-inable securities in the Banking Union?
To ensure the credibility of market discipline induced by bail-in, neither retail investors nor peer banks should appear prominently among the investor base of banks' loss absorbing capital. Empirical evidence on bank-level data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority raises a few red flags. Our list of policy recommendations encompasses disclosure policy, data sharing among supervisors, information transparency on holdings of bail-inable debt for all stakeholders, threshold values, and a well-defined upper limit for any bail-in activity. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Farina, Tatiana ; Krahnen, Jan Pieter ; Mecatti, Irene ; Pelizzon, Loriana ; Schlegel, Jonas ; Tröger, Tobias |
Publisher: |
Frankfurt a. M. : Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE |
Subject: | Banking Union | Bailin | Retail Challenge |
Saved in:
Series: | SAFE White Paper ; 92 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
ISBN: | 978-92-846-9889-9 |
Other identifiers: | 1823711073 [GVK] hdl:10419/266556 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:safewh:92 [RePEc] |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013462165