Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property

We show that in quasisupermodular games that satisfy strict single crossing property the least and greatest undominated Nash-equilibrium can be reached by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies. In the first round all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. In the successive rounds all strictly dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated.

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Year of publication:	1998-08-31
Authors:	Salonen, Hannu ; Kultti, Klaus
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 27.1998, 2, p. 305-309
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Strategic complements \| iterated dominance

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received January 1997/Final version June 1997
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371508