Job design and randomization in principal agent models

We analyze task allocation and randomization in Principal Agent models. We identify a new rationale that determines the allocation of tasks and show that it can be optimal to assign tasks that are very different to one agent. Similar to randomization, the reason to assign several tasks to one agent is to mitigate the effect of the participation constraint. We show that the allocation of tasks can be used as a substitute if randomization is not feasible.

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Year of publication:	2008-07
Authors:	Köhler, Wolfgang R.
Institutions:	Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät
Subject:	Job design \| multi-task agency \| ex-ante randomization \| moral hazard

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IEW - Working Papers. - ISSN 1424-0459.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series IEW-working papers Number 381
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040816