Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets

We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or the society is the only framework, among all oligopolistic regulatory models, where Bayesian approach is indispensable.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Koray, Semih ; Saglam, Ismail
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Bayesian Implementation \| Nash Implementation \| Asymmetric Information \| Oligopoly \| Regulation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; L50 - Regulation and Industrial Policy. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005835475