Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts

When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Rosenkranz, Stephanie ; Schmitz, Patrick W.

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1999): Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts.
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215149