Konservativer Zentralbanker versus optimaler Zentralbankkontrakt : eine spieltheoretische Analyse
Year of publication: |
1998
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Authors: | Illing, Gerhard |
Other Persons: | Fecht, Falko (contributor) |
Published in: |
Das Wirtschaftsstudium : wisu ; Zeitschrift für Ausbildung, Prüfung, Berufseinstieg und Fortbildung. - Düsseldorf : Lange, ISSN 0340-3084, ZDB-ID 120284-4. - Vol. 27.1998, 1, p. 84-93
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Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Inflationsbekämpfung | Anti-inflation policy | Zeitkonsistenz | Time consistency | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory |
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