Labor Unions, Alternative Forms of Representation, and the Exercise of Authority Relations in the American Workplace

We draw on a telephone survey of 1,000 American workers to explore whether alternative, non-union forms of representation appear to be filling the gap left by union decline, whether this matters to authority relations at work, and whether it may help to explain union decline. We find that non-union associations do not appear to be filling the gap, but that management-established, non-union representation systems are one-and-a-half times as widespread as is union representation and are evaluated somewhat more favourably by workers. We also find that both unions and management-established systems bear positive associations with authority relations at work before controlling for management practices, but that these are substantially weakened once management practices -- especially "bureaucratic" practices -- are entered. We argue that, in the case of unions, this is likely because unions cause employers to adopt these practices. But this is not likely in the case of management-established systems, which are more likely to be set up in conjunction with these practices. Finally, our results suggest that management-established systems are often in violation of the Wagner Act. But they bear no association with the propensity to vote for a union. Instead, it is bureaucratic practices that matter, independently of these systems