Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Chakrabarti, Subhadip ; Tangsangasaksri, Supanit
Published in:	Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 62.2011, 1, p. 55-64
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009194897