Labour incentive schemes in a Cournot duopoly with simple institutional constraints
Year of publication: |
2010-09-10
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Authors: | Fanti, Luciano ; Meccheri, Nicola |
Institutions: | Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Università degli Studi di Pisa |
Subject: | Cournot duopoly | principal-agent model | relative performance evaluation | institutional constraints |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
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Labour Incentive Schemes in a Cournot Duopoly with Simple Institutional Constraints
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