Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy
The literature on “audience costs†in International Relations suggests that a democratic leader’s electoral accountability lends him or her a significant advantage in crisis-bargaining situations. But if elections are the primary source of a democratic leader’s accountability, a democracy’s advantage in crisis situations should disappear when its leader is no longer eligible for reelection. Accordingly, this article asks whether “lame-duck†presidents, those who are constitutionally prohibited from reelection, are systematically less effective than their reelectable counterparts in crisis-bargaining situations. Using a data set of all post–World War II militarized interstate disputes initiated by presidential democracies, the author tests several hypotheses regarding lame-duck crisis behavior derived from Fearon’s bargaining model. The findings generally support the audience costs model. Observed patterns of threat reciprocation and crisis hostility are consistent with Fearon’s predictions. Crisis outcomes, however, do not appear to be affected by a democratic leader’s lame-duck status.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Haynes, Kyle |
Published in: |
Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Peace Science Society (International). - Vol. 56.2012, 5, p. 771-798
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Publisher: |
Peace Science Society (International) |
Subject: | audience costs | domestic politics | bargaining | elections | foreign policy | international crises |
Saved in:
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