Large elections with multiple alternatives : a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria

Johanna M. Goertz and François Maniquet

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Goertz, Johanna M. ; Maniquet, François
Publisher:	Louvain-la-Neuve : CORE
Subject:	Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Condorcet-Paradoxon \| Paradox of voting \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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