Large shareholder incentives and auditor choice
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhang, Shanshan ; Ye, Kangtao ; Cui, Yijing ; Zang, Wenjiao |
Published in: |
Auditing : a journal of practice & theory. - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., ISSN 0278-0380, ZDB-ID 638496-1. - Vol. 38.2019, 3, p. 203-222
|
Subject: | large shareholder | auditor choice | agency conflicts | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Theorie | Theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
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