LARGE SYMMETRIC GAMES ARE CHARACTERIZED BY COMPLETENESS OF THE DESIRABILITY RELATION
| Year of publication: |
1988
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | EINY, E. ; NEYMAN, A. |
| Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
| Subject: | economic theory | mathematics | games |
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