Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Biancardi, Marta Elena ; Villani, Giovanni |
Published in: |
Computational economics. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0927-7099, ZDB-ID 1142021-2. - Vol. 38.2011, 3, p. 407-423
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Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement |
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