Layoff Costs and Efficiency with Asymmetric Information
Wage determination under asymmetric information generates ine¢ ciencies due to excess turnover. Severance pay and layo¤ taxes can improve e¢ ciency. We show that inefficient separations can even be fully removed with
xed separation taxes in the case where therelevant private information is exponentially distributed.
Year of publication: |
2009-09-04
|
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Authors: | Delacroix, Alain ; Wasmer, Etienne |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Sciences économiques |
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