Layoff taxes and minimum wage: Two complementary public policies
In a matching model in which the job destruction rate and the output are endogenous, we show that the presence of a binding minimum wage prompts firms to choose too risky jobs. Introducing layoff taxes therefore reduces unemployment and improves market efficiency.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Gavrel, Frédéric ; Lebon, Isabelle ; Rebière, Thérèse |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 107.2010, 1, p. 30-32
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Employment protection Layoff taxes Minimum wage Equilibrium unemployment Market efficiency |
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