Leadership and free-riding : decomposing and explaining the paradox of cooperation in international environmental agreements
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | McGinty, Matthew |
Subject: | IEAs | Public goods | Stable coalitions | Climate change | Pollution abatement | Asymmetry | Transfers | Öffentliche Güter | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | Free rider problem | Klimawandel | Internationale Umweltpolitik | International environmental policy | Klimaschutz | Climate protection |
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