Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede Game

Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are observable. We present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the Centipede Game, where we adopt self-confirming equilibrium to capture behavior. We show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Gamba, Astrid
Published in:	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 85.2013, C, p. 112-117
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Preferences \| Altruism \| Evolution \| Learning \| Self-confirming equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D64 - Altruism ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608200