Learning in repeated auctions with budgets : regret minimization and equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Balseiro, Santiago R. ; Gur, Yonatan |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 65.2019, 9, p. 3952-3968
|
Subject: | sequential auctions | online advertising | online learning | stochastic optimization | stochastic approximation | incomplete information | regret analysis | dynamic games | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Online-Marketing | Internet marketing | Lernprozess | Learning process | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Auktion | Auction | Stochastischer Prozess | Stochastic process | E-Learning | E-learning |
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