LEARNING RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS: CLASSICAL CONDITIONS ENSURE UNIQUENESS AND GLOBAL STABILITY.
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | FOSTER, J.E. ; FRIERMAN, M. |
Institutions: | Krannert School of Management, Purdue University |
Subject: | probability | prices | information | economic equilibrium |
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