Legalize, tax, and deter : optimal enforcement policies for corruptible officials
Year of publication: |
January 2016
|
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Authors: | Burlando, Alfredo |
Other Persons: | Motta, Alberto (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of development economics. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-3878, ZDB-ID 187117-1. - Vol. 118.2016, p. 207-215
|
Subject: | Legalization | Permits | Law enforcement | Corruption | Incentives | Self reporting | Leniency program | Collusion | Korruption | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Theorie | Theory | Straffreiheit | Exemption from punishment | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Kartell | Cartel | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Kartellrecht | Antitrust law |
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