Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kandori, Michihiro ; Obara, Ichiro |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 34.2006, 4, p. 475-493
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Efficiency | Folk theorem | Garbling | Imperfect public monitoring | Prisoners’ dilemma | Repeated games |
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