Leveling the playing field for risk-averse agents in security-bid auctions
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Fioriti, Andrés ; Hernández Chanto, Allan |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 68.2022, 7, p. 5441-5463
|
Subject: | allocative efficiency | endogenous entry | insurance | Pareto efficiency | revenue | risk aversion | securities | steepness | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Pareto-Optimum |
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