Lies in Disguise - A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Jr., Martin Dufwenberg ; Dufwenberg, Martin
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	cheating \| lying \| costs \| audience \| perceived cheating aversion

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 6208
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	87365482X [GVK] hdl:10419/149295 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_6208 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; H26 - Tax Evasion
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584907