Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch

The paper contrasts the exact equilibria of games where sellers compete in price with the rational expectations equilibria of these games. It is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers in both the exact and rational expectations equilibrium converge weakly to the same limit as the number of buyers and sellers grows large. Furthermore, the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit.

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Year of publication:	1998-07-11
Authors:	Peters, Michael
Institutions:	University of Toronto, Department of Economics

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Extent:	application/postscript application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	24 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D45 - Rationing; Licensing
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827226