Limits to the scale and scope of the firm

A widespread consensus in strategy literature argues that firms acquire positions of advantage and competitive capability by assembling or “organizing” sets of uniquely complementary resources, activities, or assets. In this regard, value is created not only in identifying unique and valuable combinations of existing resources, but also in seeing unique and valuable ways to modify or cospecialize these assets. With the envisioned strategic bundle defined, the manager must then determine how to form, organize, and create this bundle. In particular, the manager must decide which assets, activities, and resources must be “owned” and which can be accessed contractually. We argue that although integration does have certain advantages over market transactions, it does not necessarily lead to the expansion of the scale and scope of the firm, because firms would also fail, particularly as they become larger in size. While established theories articulate this organizational failure puzzle in terms of incentive explanations and measurement difficulties, recent advancement in organizational economics and business strategy sees this as a result of influence activities, and social comparison and social attachment processes. These elements can serve as new building blocks for a more comprehensive theory of the nature and the boundary of the firm. Three future research trajectories – both theoretical and empirical in this realm – are suggested.