Linear, efficient and symmetric values for TU-games

In this paper, we study values for TU-games which satisfy three classical properties: Linearity, efficiency and symmetry. We give the general analytical form of these values and their relation with the Shapley value and the Egalitarian value.

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Year of publication:	2008-11-02
Authors:	Nembua, Célestin Chameni ; Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2008, 71, p. 1-10
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630168