Litigation Selection as a Signal under Asymmetric Information: A Two-Type Model with Alternating Bargaining Offers
Year of publication: |
2000-12
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kim, Iljoong ; Kim, Jaehong |
Institutions: | Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University |
Subject: | asymmetric information | signaling | litigation | settlement | win rate |
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